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The Nicaraguan experience becomes a valuable case study since it allows us to analyze 
in detail the impact of an extensive modification to the property right system and to 
other relevant agricultural markets within a relatively short time period.  Moreover, 
with this evidence it is possible to assess how policy making and enactment alter 
the institutional and socio-economic scenario and the behavior of agents (regarding 
their investment and production plans). Our findings indicate that incentives 
structures and carefully coordinated State intervention are of great importance in 
achieving sustained development. The Sandinista rural agenda involved detailed 
structural and marketing programs aimed at eliminating the previous latifundio 
structure, yet by the end of the 1980´s national agriculture was stagnated. It will be 
argued in the present paper that the consequences of an uncoordinated Agrarian 
Reform deepened the imperfections of not only the land market but also the credit 
and labor markets in Nicaragua. A major conclusion is that without an adequate 
and legitimate policy environment that reduces uncertainty and maintains financial 
incentives, even abundant access to resources will not overcome economic paralysis.
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Resumen
La experiencia nicaragüense se considera un valioso caso de estudio puesto que 
permite analizar en detalle el impacto de una exhaustiva modificación al sistema 
de propiedad privada y  mercados relacionados a la agricultura que tuvo lugar en 
un relativamente corto periodo de tiempo.  De esta manera, es posible evaluar cómo 
las políticas gubernamentales cambiaron el escenario institucional y económico, así 
como el comportamiento de los diferentes agentes (en lo referente a sus planes de 
producción e inversión).  Nuestros hallazgos indican que la estructura de incentivos 
y una intervención estatal coordinada son aspectos cruciales para alcanzar un 
desarrollo sostenido.  La agenda rural del Sandinismo incluía detallados programas 
estructurales encaminados a la eliminación del modelo latifundista antecesor, pero 
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hacia finales de la década de los 80, la agricultura nacional se encontraba estancada.  
En el presente estudio se alega que las consecuencias de una reforma agraria 
descoordinada incrementaron las imperfecciones, no solamente del mercado de 
tierras, sino también del mercado laboral y crediticio en Nicaragua. Una importante 
conclusión radica en que sin un ambiente institucional adecuado y legítimo que 
reduzca la incertidumbre y mantenga los incentivos financieros intactos, el acceso 
abundante a recursos no conlleva necesariamente a una mayor actividad económica.
Palabras clave: reforma agraria / políticas / Revolución Sandinista / Nicaragua
1. Introduction
Throughout Nicaraguan history, access to land, agricultural services, credit and resources 
in general has been monopolized by the political elites. The story of the peasantry has been 
one of social exclusion and exploitation. 
During the Sandinista period (1979-1990) an extensive Agrarian Reform was undertaken. 
Policies involved land redistribution, fixed prices, subsidized credit and inputs. Their main 
objective was to eliminate the agro-export model which predominated during Somocista 
regime.    
To explore the economic impact of such reform, a summary of the Nicaraguan agricultural 
structure prior to 1979 is presented in Section 2. Theories on agricultural development 
economics are reviewed in Section 3 so that in Section 4 the effectiveness of the Sandinista 
agrarian program may be thoroughly examined. Section 5 presents concluding remarks.
2. Agrarian Structure in Pre-Revolutionary Nicaragua 
Between the 1880’s and 1950´s Nicaragua experienced a prolonged economic boom in 
cotton production. Cotton was then replaced by coffee which became the leading export 
along with sugar, livestock and gold until 1979 (Saravia, 2003). During this time period, an 
agro-export structure was consolidated consisting of large private estates. By 1978, 37% of 
the rural Economic Active Population was categorized as landless (Reinhardt 1987, p. 943). 
Only the minority was guaranteed a permanent wage.  The oversupply of seasonal labor 
induced massive migration to the urban centers.  Despite access to cheap labor, Godoy and 
Hockenstein (1992, p. 1687) state that by the 1950’s Nicaragua had “the most mechanized 
agriculture of Central America”.  
Table 1. Percent Distribution of Land by Size and Tenancy, 1978
Farms %
356 + Hectares 41.3
3.6 – 355 Hectares 43.5
0.1– 3.5 Hectares 15.2
Source: Deere, Marchetti and Reindhardt (1985, p. 79)





























41.3% of the land area in Nicaragua1 was organized into the latifundio structure2 (Table 
1).  Latifundios are very large landholdings and for the Nicaraguan case, several authors 
(Jonakin, 1996, p. 1188; Kaimowitz & Stanfield, 1995, p. 52; Spoor, 1990, p. 524; Zalkin, 1990, 
p. 48) concur in categorizing them as farms of 356 or more hectares. The minifundios, on 
the other hand, are the smallest farms (0.1 – 3.5 hectares), too small to provide employment 
for a single family.  Although a small percentage of land, they represent a large percentage 
of the total number of landholdings.
The agricultural sector was not only characterized by an unequal distribution of land, but by 
unequal access to credit as well.  Most of the properties owned by el somocismo were large-
scale export-oriented units which constituted the main beneficiaries of credit, receiving 
along with the other export producers, over 90% of agricultural bank loans during the first 
half of the 1960’s.  It was the access to credit that made agro-export landowners turn to 
capital intensive (instead of labor intensive) production schemes.  On the other hand, small 
and medium producers of staple crops for the internal market received less than 10% of 
agricultural credit in 1970, even if at the time, together they held around half of the cultivated 
area (Enriquez & Spalding, 1987, p. 109).
Planning the national economy around a few agro-exportable goods promoted not only an 
unequal land distribution but it also implied that the whole country, particularly the rural 
wage dependent class, was vulnerable to international price instability; while agricultural 
elites alone benefited from the periods of bonanza. Ultimately, the agro-export model served 
to perpetuate poverty and increase social resentment. After all, cross country evidence has 
proved that the majority of commodity boom cases tended to reinforce pre-existing social, 
political and economic divisions rather than reducing or eliminating them (Binswanger & 
Deininger 1997, p. 1989). This is particularly the case in highly polarized societies where the 
interrelations of economic and political power only allow a reduced social sector to benefit 
from positive external shocks.  In Nicaragua this has occurred twice during the cotton and 
coffee boom of the late 1880’s and the 1950’s respectively.  Interestingly, both governments 
were eventually overthrown by revolutionary movements in 1893 and 1979 certainly fuelled 
in part by the increasing levels of inequality and social tension that accompany this type of 
economic growth.
3. Theories on Agricultural Development
3.1. Conceptions of the Role of Agriculture in Economic Activity
In 1954 Lewis proposed his dual sector development model. It was based on the assumption 
that many developing countries had dual economies with both a traditional agricultural 
sector and a modern industrial sector.  The dual economy model has become a predominant 
analytical paradigm which has strongly influenced policy making since the post World 
War II decades. In this respect, agriculture has been considered the less efficient, less 
productive economic sector. Griffin explains that in the conception of the dualistic models 
“the traditional, feudal, agricultural sector is stagnant; production is for subsistence; 
little output passes through a market; the leisure preferences of producers are high and 
they do not follow maximizing behavior.  Unemployment is assumed to be widespread… 
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and, indeed, the marginal product of labor is zero if not negative” (Griffin, 1969, p. 20); 
its counterpart, the industrial sector in the urban environment, possesses all the desirable 
opposite characteristics that include technological advancement, higher levels of investment 
and savings, etc. Griffin points out that this theoretical background has strengthened and 
deepened the bias in favor of the urban segment in most development strategies.
In Latin America, the widespread theories of Structuralism and Dependency embraced such 
dualistic views of the economy as well.  Policies associated with the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA) emphasized, since the 1950’s, programs of industrialization through 
import substitution under the premise of agriculture’s low productivity and comparative 
disadvantage in the global markets.  The results led to serious deficits on the balance of 
payments, over-valued exchange rates and a strongly rooted myth that there is no profit 
maximizing behavior in the traditional sector.
Authors like Griffin (1969), and Todaro and Smith (2003) argue that peasants’ behavior is 
actually the rational reaction to their institutional environment.  In Latin America, as in many 
other underdeveloped regions of the world, peasant agriculture is one of subsistence and it 
is marked by high risks and uncertain rewards.  Therefore, the inclination to under invest 
or to shirk can be explained as a reasonable response to ineffective government policies 
which have failed in altering the unfavorable land tenure conditions, the limited access to 
competitive credit and insurance markets, the level of technical and social assistance for 
the rural class, etc. Unfortunately, it is under this disadvantageous institutional framework 
that peasants operate, and are swiftly catalogued as inefficient and/or irrational economic 
agents.
Despite the failure of Import Substitution programs in Latin America, their theoretical 
legacies continued to influence policy formulation. More “modern” agricultural development 
programs fostered the expansion of large capitalized estates that take up land from the rural 
population and diminish the demand of peasant labor as they become more mechanized. 
Thus, there is a movement of labor from the rural to the urban (industrial) sector.  The 
argument behind such an approach relies on the debated idea that small farms are unable to 
benefit from economies of scale and therefore constitute inferior forms of production.  This 
type of analysis is congruent to the latifundio-minifundio structure of Latin American 
Agriculture and the high social costs that go with it.  
In fact, one feature of latifundismo is that transactions costs involved in supervising 
hired labor are much higher than when using the more motivated family labor on peasant 
farms.  Empirical studies have provided evidence of the potential benefits of small farms 
in promoting rural development and social efficiency (Berry & Cline, 1979; Ghatak, 1987). 
According to Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami (1992, p. 1974), “the scope of scale economies 
is rather limited in agricultural production” for developing countries. They suggest that 
monitoring hired labor in production systems that involve mixed crop rotation and raising 
livestock can be substantial; making the family farm the optimal structure (except for some 
export plantation that require detailed coordination for processing and marketing).
The key determinant that makes smaller farms more efficient than larger ones is their 
higher degree of land utilization (provided that the landholdings are not so small that they 





























are trapped under the constraints of minifundismo).  Todaro and Smith (2003) point out 
one of such costs: “a major explanation for the relative economic inefficiency of farming the 
fertile land on the latifundios in comparison with minifundios is simply that the wealthy 
landowners often value these holdings not for their potential contributions to the national 
agricultural output but rather for the considerable power and prestige that they bring”. 
Under this premise, it is not surprising that a study by Collin (1982, p. 89) reported that 
during the late 1970’s in Nicaragua, approximately 30% of the most fertile land of the private 
large estates was idle, inadequately used or less intensively farmed than smaller plots. 
Ghatak (1987, p. 355) presents a list of reasons why there is an inverse relationship between 
farm size and output per acre based on empirical studies in the 1960’s for Indian agriculture:
1. Poor farmers in distress sell land of inferior quality to the landowners of larger plots 
while he keeps the more fertile smaller plot.
2. Small farmers tend to use inputs such as labor more intensively and efficiently because 
they operate to achieve a level of survival. Unlike larger landholders, peasants in small 
plots maximize total income not profit. Family labor is employed until its marginal 
productivity equals zero in the peasant small farm, while “capitalistic” farming employs 
labor until the level where marginal productivity equals the wage.
3. Many large farmers use tenants or share croppers for production. Such arrangements 
are usually not instituted in a legal framework and unchain tenure disincentives that 
are not present in owner-operated plots; these include the risk of eviction for the tiller 
or the fact that well-off farmers tend to spend more in conspicuous consumption than in 
efficient investment since they will not be full beneficiaries of any type of innovation that 
is implemented.
Although sharecropping in Latin America is not as common as it is in Asia3 , the previous 
arguments hold generally for Latin American countries.  
Another interesting supporting fact of small farming is that ceteris paribus, the rate of 
adoption of new technology, in least developed countries has been scale-neutral (Ghatak, 
1987, p. 357), making the small farm more socially efficient given its labor intensive nature. 
As suggested by many authors, the major agrarian problem in Latin America is the unequal 
distribution of land.  But at the same time, Binswanger and Deininger (1997, p. 1969) stress 
that the characteristics of the farm economy (more specifically the imperfections of the 
financial and insurance markets) reinforce the stagnant agricultural structure; indicating 
that the redistribution of property titles alone would not be sufficient to guarantee rural 
development. In addition, sustained growth of agricultural productivity depends on the 
implementation of policies that induce research on new technologies and investment in 
human and physical capital.  Nevertheless, the majority of underdeveloped countries 
tend to neglect primary education, under invest in agricultural research and direct a 
disproportionate amount of the public resources to urban areas instead.  Many authors 
agree that without rural education and political participation the agricultural power 
structures will not undergo the metamorphosis required to promote equality and economic 
growth.  This statement becomes self-evident and almost redundant given the fact that over 
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two-thirds of the world’s poorest people are located in rural areas and engaged primarily in 
subsistence agriculture (Todaro & Smith, 2003, p. 418).
3.2. Literature on Agrarian Contracts
The dualistic models’ assumption of non-maximizing behavior of agents in the agricultural 
sector can be further discussed when the literature on agrarian contracts is examined. 
Peasants in developing economies do make efficient choices from the range of options 
available to them.  Such options vary from casual employment to short or long-term tenancy 
or owner cultivation.  The efficiency in the agricultural productive process is determined 
substantially by the conditions stipulated in the contract between landlord and tiller. Given 
the characteristics of the farm economy and the latifundio-minifundio structure in Latin 
America, the position of the tiller is usually one of great disadvantage.
An efficient contract is enforceable and provides strong work incentives.  Three types of 
contracts are widely analyzed:
1. Fixed-wage labor contract
2. Pure share contract
3. Fixed-rent tenancy contract
Work incentives for tillers are weaker in type 1 contracts and stronger in type 3. Peasants 
will be more inclined to shirk under sharecropping than under a fixed-rent contract 
because of the burden implied in giving up part of the output to the landlord.  Tenants in 
a fixed rental system would also be much more willing than sharecroppers to undertake 
innovation.  Allocation of land rights to owner-operators is expected to increase the 
efficiency of agricultural production, since it encourages future investment decisions and 
reduces transaction costs between agents. But, if a land reform is not in the political agenda, 
Berry and Cline (1979, p. 3) suggest that regulations on land tenancy should encourage large 
landowners to rent out their land in small operational units instead of evicting tenants and 
moving to fixed wage labor arrangements.
The degree of contract enforceability depends on whether there is a regulating legal framework 
for the different tenancy arrangements or if strong informal penalties exist within the rural 
communities. If reputation is a social asset, enforceability of contracts is further ensured. 
In the case of interlinked contracts, the superior bargaining position of the landlord also 
becomes an enforcing factor.  According to Baumeister (1984, p. 189), prior to 1979, given 
the high degree of land concentration, the fixed wage labor contract (characterized by its 
weak work incentives) was particularly common in Nicaragua’s rural sector.  After 1979, the 
introduction of collective land tenure schemes would nevertheless prove highly inefficient in 
terms of creating material incentives and fostering contract enforceability. 
Bhaduri’s (1973) study of agricultural backwardness under semi-feudalism explains that 
the landlords’ incomes may come in the form of land rental, share of agricultural output 
and/or usury. Interest rates are usually very high in rural areas. Some authors attribute this 
to the high probability of default of smaller farmers, but others are more inclined to believe 





























there are informational asymmetries that act as entry barriers for the formal financial 
market serving to create virtual monopolies in the different rural communities.  The case 
is that when landowners also become the moneylenders they design interlinked contracts 
which secure their maximum combined profit, trapping the tillers in perpetual debt.  It is 
argued further that the introduction of technical progress in this “semi feudal” agriculture is 
prevented by landlords as long as the gains from usury are more than those from increased 
productivity.  There are critiques to Bhaduri’s model (particularly, regarding the ability of 
the landlord to extract additional income from the tiller despite the introduction of new 
technology, and the capacity of the tiller to escape debt); but the main message of the semi-
feudal agricultural model is clear: small producers have weak bargaining power, they usually 
are excluded from the relevant markets and the lack of investment in basic infrastructure 
and human capital intensifies rural poverty and agricultural stagnation. In other words, 
peasants of a subsistence economy who are risk averse and who lack access to alternative 
sources of credit or broader land markets (because of geographical isolation or imperfect 
markets), have precarious opportunities to prosper.  Bhaduri’s study illustrates some of the 
main characteristics of the so called Patrón-Cliente relationship in Latin America.
3.3 On the Nature of Land and Agrarian Reforms and their Impact on Development
Arthur Young claimed that “the magic of property turns sand into gold”, but evidence 
has proved that an egalitarian land reform program alone is not sufficient to guarantee 
agricultural development (Todaro & Smith, 2003, p453).  
As argued by Ghatak (1987, p. 358), any redistribution of land in favor of small farms 
creates uncertainty and unless “the government is stable and the policy is enforced firmly, 
small farmers are unlikely to invest substantially as the stakes can be too high”.  There 
are therefore, implicit costs to the extent of the period of uncertainty because it delays the 
investment and implementation of new technologies in the reformed sectors of the economy. 
In other words, the agents of the reformed sector are struggling to avoid the risk of ex-post 
opportunism.  Naturally, a successful reform must also make sure the targeted population 
has access to agricultural services and relevant markets.  Negative incentives could also 
arise from a very egalitarian land reform, especially for the farmers whose properties 
are confiscated without proper compensation.  And if the affected sector has political and 
economic power, the success of the entire reform could be jeopardized.  In the view of Alan 
de Janvry (1981), land reform is not a device to help the poor but to benefit the non-reformed 
sector. His conclusion was drawn after examining the Latin-American experiences and it 
certainly portrays the socio-political tensions that arose in these processes.
Setting aside the obvious costs of socio-political tension and uncertainty, Berry and Cline 
(1979, p. 3) have analyzed other costs related to reorganizing land from larger to smaller 
units: these concern: 
1. Creation of the administrative capacity to support small farms.  
2. Learning period of managerial skills that the new operators actually require in order to 
achieve the productivity levels of existing small farms.
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Deciding how long a period to carry out a land reform should certainly be a relevant issue. 
If properties are confiscated rapidly and indiscriminately, legitimacy might be harmed in 
the process.  But on the other hand, if the administration is not efficient enough so that land 
and resources reach the targeted population, the desired economic effects of the reform 
will not be achieved.  Not being able to find such a balance implies that political support is 
diminished and the levels of uncertainty increase ultimately hindering economic activity.
Berry and Cline favor land reforms and conclude that the expansion of the small farm 
constitutes an effective mechanism to increase employment and output in the agricultural 
sector, as long as the country has a surplus of labor at low opportunity cost. It is until the 
opportunity cost of labor becomes relatively high that the advantages of small farms tend to 
disappear. In the meantime, as Doner (1992, p. 70) argues, “people cannot simply be placed 
on hold until they are needed by the industry”, stressing major importance on the potential 
social benefits of a land reform.
The objectives of an equalizing land reform are to avoid the inefficiency of large estates and 
the limitation of very small plots which are not economically viable, that is, landholdings so 
small which are unable to provide a living for a family (Minifundismo).  But as expressed by 
El-Ghonemy (1990, pp. 89-90) agrarian reforms involve much more than just land distribution 
and reassignment of property titles.  Agrarian policies cover a wide range of aspects that 
regulate on rental arrangements, financial access to tenants, managerial and technical 
assistance, subsidies and price controls of key inputs, etc.  All of these institutional changes 
and dispositions are designed to recompose the distribution of power in the economic 
relations of agents in the rural areas: “the aim is to remove barriers to entry into the factor 
markets and to provide peasants with command over food thereby rapidly reducing poverty 
and inequalities” (El-Ghonemy, 1990, p. 88).
Some commonly highlighted factors that determine the success of reforms include:
1. Level of political commitment, organizational capacity and fiscal discipline.
2. Design and coordination of sustained and growth stimulating agrarian policies. 
3. Length of the reform period and its perceived degree of uncertainty and legitimacy.  
4. Planned extent of the reform to restructure the agricultural sector (limits on the size of 
farms, target of beneficiaries, types of ownership arrangements, etc.).
5. Degree and nature of national and international support.
In summary, the economic results of agrarian reforms have tended to be more favorable 
where implementation has been swift (avoiding periods of uncertainty), and when the 
government has provided the necessary infrastructure, extension services and improved 
inputs (replacing the dominant role of large landowners in rural communities and opening 
these to larger and more competitive factor markets).
Various experiences with land reform also appear to show a pattern of greater production 
success where post reform organization is based upon direct ownership in small family 
farms rather than upon State and cooperative farms (Berry & Cline, 1979, pp. 135-140). 
Doner (1992, pp. 50-56) argues as well that even with supportive efforts by government 





























agencies, problems of internal organization and of member commitment and morale will 
arise in group farming. Such problems are manifested in poor management, lack of work 
discipline and absence of active participation in policy making by the members, all of which 
undermine the capacity of efficient production of the cooperatives.  As will be explained, 
this was particularly the case with cooperatives formed during the Sandinista Revolution. 
According to Deere (1983, p. 1004), the State encouraged rural workers to organize into 
cooperatives, however organizationally, cooperatives were weak and many dissolved after 
receiving credit.
On the whole, the results of an agrarian reform are further conditioned by the pre-existing 
structure of the agricultural economy which has permeated the attitude of farmers towards 
risk and entrepreneurship. Moreover, the policy makers must be fully aware of the economic 
and cultural context in order to ensure that adequate incentives are promoted and sustained. 
For example, overvalued exchange rates, discriminatory rates of tariff favoring imports of 
tractors, and the provision of agricultural credit at a very low rate of interest, have resulted 
in the use of capital intensive techniques in labor surplus agriculture.  Such policies which 
at first instance seem growth-enhancing actually hinder long-term rural development and 
social welfare too because the main beneficiaries have been the better off farmers.
4. The Sandinista Agrarian Reform
Unlike other agrarian reforms in Latin America, the Sandinista Administration had correctly 
realized that redistribution of land alone was not enough to alter the structure of rural 
economic relationships in Nicaragua (Zalkin, 1990, p. 62).  In order to eradicate entirely 
the exploitative capitalist system that characterized Somoza’s regime, the Revolution 




Price policies were concerned with the farm-gate prices which peasants received for their 
products.  The main objective was to stabilize income for the rural producers at the national 
level.  Structural policies are those designed to improve the structure of agricultural 
production (equipment of farm, infrastructure, water supplies, advisory services, social 
facilities, etc.) (Halett, 1968, p. 6).  For this purpose the Sandinistas provided massive 
access to credit that mainly benefited State farms and cooperatives.  At the same time, 
large subsidies to agricultural inputs such as machinery, herbicides and fertilizers were 
granted.  Marketing policies were formulated to change the distributive channels that had 
characterized the agro-export model. The idea was to free the farmer from the latifundistas’ 
superior bargaining position. Therefore, the revolutionary State decided to obtain control of 
all systems of retailing and wholesaling of agricultural output so that exploitative distributive 
margins could be eliminated once and for all.  
Through State intervention, the Revolution aimed to achieve two major objectives: (Close, 
1988, p. 82)
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1. Restructure the economy to make it less dependent on the export of raw materials.
2. Redistribute the products of the economy to favor the “popular” classes.
Unfortunately, to fulfill the first objective of promoting an industrial rather than agricultural 
economy, many members of the Higher State Council were convinced that small and medium 
peasants could not play a major role. Zalkin (1990, p. 60) comments that by 1981 Jaime 
Wheelock, Sandinista Ministry of Agriculture, presented a plan for State-led mechanization 
and industrialization of agriculture based on the extreme assumption that peasant grain 
producers were incapable of productivity increases. As a result, investment strategies 
evolved around State farms and certain private latifundios that remained unreformed and 
were to produce under highly capital-intensive technology.  These estates were expected to 
emerge as modern agro-industrial complexes.
The second objective was to be achieved by promoting cooperative organization, which in 
theory could devote to either agro-industrial or basic staples production.  For them, both 
credit and technical assistance was to be provided so that the benefits of economies of scale 
could be obtained.  
Why were not these objectives fulfilled?  The answer involves a double explanation.  First 
of all, the land reform program instead of benefiting small producers turned to a socialist 
land tenure scheme that did not adapt to the peasantry’s expectations and only created 
institutional friction and uncertainty over 40% of Nicaragua’s total land area.  Second, the 
myopic belief that the State was going to be able to fully organize more than a thousand State 
farms, tens of thousands of cooperatives, and then coordinate all economic transactions, 
eventually led to a total disarticulation of the Nicaraguan rural productive system.
4.1. The Land Reform Process
After Somoza abandoned the country on July 1979, around 2000 farms belonging to the 
dictator’s family and his associates were immediately confiscated under Decree 3 ordered 
by the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction (1979-1984).  As mentioned earlier, 
these were large high tech agro-export farms comprising around 20% of the farm land in 
the country.4 These properties were not distributed but rather organized into 1500 State 
farms that belonged to what was denominated Area Property of the People (APP: Área 
Propiedad del Pueblo) under the direct control of the Ministry of Agricultural Development 
and Agrarian Reform (MIDINRA). This was the first stage of the Agrarian Reform. “In the 
short run this made the revolutionary government less sensitive to demands from peasants 
and urban small producers” (Close, 1988, p. 83).
The Sandinista administration truly feared that “parcelization” of such estates for 
individualized farming would reduce the production of export crops and harm the inflow of 
foreign currency. As a consequence, large-scale production was unambiguously favored in 
terms of investment and technical assistance. While agricultural GDP represented 23% of 
total GDP during 1980-1986, agricultural investment received 41% of all investment funds. 
And from 1983 to1990, 71% of agricultural investment was concentrated in the State farms or 
APP, 25% in production cooperatives and only 4% in private farms (Zalkin, 1990, pp. 56-62).





























According to Kaimowitz and Stanfield (1995, pp. 55-54) there were several factors that 
favored a State farm solution to the eyes of the revolutionaries:
1. The concern that if the confiscated lands were turned over to an unorganized peasantry, 
falling productivity would result at that critical moment in which the country was trying 
to rebuild its economy after the devastating effects of the war.
2. The fear that giving the confiscated farms over to cooperatives or small individual 
farmers could result in a movement away from export crops and toward food crops. 
Such shift would endanger foreign exchange generated from the export crops
3. The idea that cooperative landholders would no longer be willing to work as wage 
workers in the coffee, cotton and sugar harvests, thus creating labor shortages in the 
production of these crops.
At this early stage, the Sandinista Government were not convinced of the role of the small 
peasantry to secure rural development.  In the meantime, the Revolution adopted a policy 
of employment generation on the State farms as a first step toward accommodating the 
landless rural work force. Some 50,000 workers, approximately 13% of all agricultural 
workers, were employed by the State agricultural enterprises in 1980. This segment of the 
rural population stopped being the patrón’s workers to become State employees, a new class 
of rural proletariats. However, this strategy was not going to be very effective in the long run 
without violating the political commitment to a mixed economy, simply because the landless 
rural workers (the majority without access to permanent employment) and smallholders 
(who also formed part of the seasonal wage labor force for the agro-export production) 
accounted for over 75% of the rural economically active population EAP of 430,065 at the 
beginning of the 1980’s (Deere, 1983, p. 1043). Nationalizing 100% of Nicaragua’s arable land 
was not viable both economically and politically.  Moreover, in the early days the State farms 
were faced with a number of difficult problems. Many workers expected less hard work, 
less repressive management procedures, and higher wages than what they had experienced 
during Somoza’s regime. In the first years of the Revolution (1980-1984) labor productivity 
fell and the length of the working day dropped dramatically from 6 to 2.5 hours per day 
(Spoor, 1990, p. 538).
At this point in time, the Sandinistas not only supported State farms but also gave a private 
group of large and medium agro-export producers not related to el somocismo preferred 
access to credit and subsidized inputs. Particularly favored were those members of 
elitist Conservative clans with whom Sandinista guerrillas had had close ties during the 
insurrectionary period. In fact, expropriation and confiscation did not have a dramatic 
impact on these families’ landholdings and financial interests (Everingham, 2001, p. 64). 
But as the Sandinista chiefs started to acquire properties in the rural and urban sector, the 
political support from the middle and upper class started to diminish.
Nationalization was not limited to land. Under Decree 38 the financial system was 
nationalized along with gold and silver mining, the forest industry and the fishery.  The 
Sandinistas also controlled foreign currency movements and foreign trade of the traditional 
exports (coffee, cotton, sugar and meat) for they recognized this was an important source 
of funds.  In other words, the State, and not the Private Enterprise, was to assume the 
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governing role in the mixed economy so that progress could be made in terms of education, 
health and social security (the so called “social wages”). Non-cash benefits also included 
subsidies on basic goods (food, clothing and other personal necessities).  As the State began 
this strategy of major control in the economy, even the better off private agrarian sector 
adopted a “wait and see” attitude despite the incentives offered at the early stages of the 
Revolution.  At that point, the high degree of uncertainty was blocking future investment and 
production decisions.
By the end of the first two years of the Revolution, the State had focused on consolidating 
the rural sector and organizing the rural population as a work force (Deere, Marchetti, and 
Reinhardt., 1985) and it can be said that a substantial proportion of the latifundios were 
only transferred from private to public hands. The Junta had overlooked the needs of the 
landless and small producers who waited impatiently for a land reform that could benefit 
them directly.  The Sandinistas responded by issuing a series of land rental regulations, 
which required landlords to rent unused and under-utilized land at officially regulated rates 
that were not only below market rates but more importantly in a short period of time were 
eroded by inflation. The land rental policy was complemented by a liberal agricultural credit 
policy in order to spur basic grain production and cooperative development (Deere, 1983, 
p. 1043). Nevertheless, many peasant families spontaneously took over idle land, creating 
further tension between the government and the bourgeoisie; the business uncertainty 
was further increased. At the beginning many squatters were evicted but finally political 
pressure from the peasantry gave way on August 1981 to the enactment of the Agrarian 
Reform Law.  Decree 782 stated: “landowners with over 350 hectares in the Pacific (Western) 
regions or over 700 hectares in the central regions could have their lands expropriated for 
under utilization, sharecropping, or disinvestments or if the areas were declared Agrarian 
Reform zones” (Doner, 1992, p. 44). “Under utilization” or “disinvestments” implied tilling 
less than 75% of the arable proportion in a given property.  
Particularly upsetting for landlords was the disposition towards absentee owners (Decree 
760) which allowed the Sandinista administration to confiscate properties of any size 
(without any kind of compensation) that had been idle or abandoned for at least six months. 
It is important to point out that in the precedent years the country had suffered war and 
political instability and many medium and small landlords unrelated to el somocismo 
felt threatened and robbed with the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law in 1981. State 
actions under Decrees 760 and 782 affected more than 1,500 properties and an additional 
10% of arable land between 1981 and 1988 (Everingham, 2001, p. 64). 
It is important to point out that individual plots were not widely assigned because strategic 
preference was given to a more cooperative, socialist organizational scheme of production. 
However, Zalkin (1990, pp. 56-59) explains that State efforts to produce corn, rice, sugar 
and beef using advanced technologies on its own farms in the fertile Pacific region ran 
into numerous problems. Yields were lower than expected, resulting in high-cost output; 
management and operational problems also arose. State farm workers were among the 
lowest paid and they had secure employment because dismissals implied a high political 
cost for the government.  As a result, there was little penalty for shirking.  In addition, 
there was no incentive wage or profit-sharing structure that might have stimulated greater 





























worker effort or concern for successful operation of each enterprise; no participation of 
workers in decision making was evidenced either. It was the poor profitability shown by 
the State farms in the first few years that eventually weakened their position as a superior 
model of production within the MIDINRA and more attention was given to cooperatives.  
It must be mentioned that the war played a role in accelerating the government’s timetable 
for the redistribution of land to the cooperatives. Land redistribution became the main tool 
to strengthen political support and stop the unsatisfied peasantry from collaborating with 
counterrevolutionary forces as the war intensity escalated.  For instance, between October 
1981 and December 1983, an average of 937 families per month received some sort of 
agrarian title over their land holding.  But political discontent was evident in the results of 
the 1984 elections.  As a consequence, around 30,000 titles were given to squatters on that 
same year even when the State had not reached any legitimate compensatory arrangements 
with the previous owners. In 1984, the average of families per month receiving agrarian 
titles increased to 3,324 (Kaimowitz & Stanfield, 1995, p. 73). Such hasty “legalizations” 
undermined the legitimacy of the land reform process but there was additional and real 
pressure from the resettlement of peasants living in the conflict zones5.  By March 1985 
there were 170,000 displaced people for whom the government had to provide land and basic 
housing conditions in the western zone of Nicaragua (Melrose, 1985, p. 37).  
As those affected by the confiscations started unsuccessful litigations during the 1980’s to 
obtain restitutions or financial compensations, the beneficiaries of Agrarian Reform titles 
did not experience enough tenurial security and so work incentives were low and investment 
(if undertaken at all) was usually sub-optimal. By 1990 (when the opposition came to power) 
the volume of property restitution claims exceeded the total size of the country’s land area 
(Merlet & Pommier, 2000 cited by Deininger & Chamorro, 2004, p. 103). It was not until March 
1990 that the National Assembly (still dominated by Sandinista deputies) rushed to pass 
the Law of Protection of Agricultural Property, which guaranteed land rights acquired by 
individual producers, cooperatives, and indigenous communities that had received titles 
between 1980 and 1989, and also granted the full disposition of ownership through Agrarian 
Reform. Thus, for some, their titles were not guaranteed for a decade.
Originally the Sandinista policy makers had hoped that small peasants would merge their 
individual plots and turn them into production cooperatives. In fact, this happened only 
in isolated instances.  In the vast majority of the cases, it was the incentive of access to 
land which provided the incentive to form a production cooperative. At the same time, easy 
access to credit and subsidized inputs were an important incentive. 
There were two types of cooperatives:  CCS (Credit and Service Cooperatives) and CAS 
(Sandinista Agricultural Cooperatives). In CCS’s members retained individual title to their 
land, but in CAS’s members held a collective land title. The CCS’s were formed by existing 
smallholders who had wide access to credit but did not obtain additional land. Under CAS’s, 
members were assigned land and were supposed to pool their resources, set their own work 
norms, divide profits and take investment decisions.  Kaimowitz and Stanfield (1995, p. 
61) point out that practically all capital formation on the CAS’s came from bank loans and 
access to land continued to be the most important incentive in their formation.  In 1982, 2,800 
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cooperatives had been established (46% CCS and 54% CAS) comprising 68,434 members. 
By 1983, almost 15% of Nicaragua’s arable land was organized into cooperatives.  The 
Sandinista regime leaned heavily on co-operators to conform their economic decisions to a 
State-directed development agenda. The vast majority of CAS lands -over 97%- originated in 
lands confiscated from large estates.  As a result, CAS’s members’ production and investment 
decisions were not executed unless they were congruent to the State’s economic program. 
In most cases, the State imposed and directed the entire production process of the CAS’s.
Even though production of corn, beans and rice shot up in the first year of the reform, it 
is not clear in the literature whether it was a real effect of improved collective technical 
efficiency or just the effect of an expansive credit policy (Carter, 1989). According to Deere, 
Marchetti and Reinhardt. (1985), very few cooperatives engaged in long term investment, 
and many were dissolved soon after receiving credit.  
Jonakin (1994) explains that the usurpation of operational control by the State had 
devastating consequences for work incentives and performance of the cooperatives.  The 
author claims that State interventions induced co-operators to adopt land use patterns 
which favored collective areas to the near exclusion of household plots.  There was also 
strong pressure to sow and market crops that accorded with the government’s rather than 
peasants’ preferences. Moreover, peasants were forced to implement capital intensive 
technology which annulated the opportunity to involve family members in the collective 
tilling.
Work incentives were also hampered by the imposition of unrealistically high rates of 
investment from retained earnings.  For example, Article 123 of the Cooperatives General 
Rules required that earnings net of operating costs be divided among four funds: Contingency 
Fund (10%), Social and Education Fund (15%), an Investment Fund (25%) and a Distributed 
Profits Fund (50%).  More importantly, the State did not define clear collective property 
rights and was slow to grant titles that could make cooperative membership worth the effort. 
Additionally, cooperatives were the main targets of counterrevolutionary attacks because 
their objective was to undermine the population’s involvement in the Sandinista political 
and economic program.
It was hoped that the CAS would capture production and administrative scale economies, 
promote the modernization of agriculture and assure formerly landless workers or 
minifundistas access to productive resources (Jonakin, 1995, p. 242).  But considering that 
up to 10% of the cultivable land on the CAS was reported to be idle in 1985 both unemployed 
family members of the co-operators and the still landless rural population rightfully 
came to see the CAS as another inefficient latifundio.  It was obvious that the ill-defined 
membership and the lack of material incentives fostered by State intervention in the running 
of cooperatives contributed greatly to their disappointing performance.  
Dispositions changed in 1985 as the Sandinista government reversed its earlier stands and 
began to give titles to individuals without insisting they enter a cooperative. Even though 
the land distributed was free of charge to the beneficiaries, it came with a list of restrictions. 
The assignment took place through the issuance of an Agrarian Reform Title by the Ministry 





























of Agriculture.  The titled land could not be rented out or sold and although it could be 
inherited, subdivision among heirs was not permitted.  Consequently, the land market 
activity was hindered and agrarian titles were seen as inferior forms of land titles.  
Even though the titled land could be used as credit guarantee, it could not be taken and 
sold by the bank in the case of non-payment (Kaimowitz & Stanfield, 1995, p. 57) simply 
because the entire banking system had been nationalized anyway. As a result, Agrarian 
Reform beneficiaries, both cooperatives and individuals, usually ended using credit for 
family consumption instead of investment given the highly uncertain and unstable political 
scenario.  It was a clear situation of moral hazard.
In summary, the revolutionary administration failed to secure formal tenurial arrangements 
for individual small producers and even cooperative members who represented critical 
components of the revolutionary alliance (Enríquez, 1991 y Martínez, 1993, cited by 
Everingham, 2001, p 65).  By 1988 only 55,000 of the 120,000 households located in cooperative 
zones had received private titles. In September 1989, cooperative leaders and small peasants 
advocated the creation of a land registry for the entire reformed sector, but the government 
did not seriously pursue the proposal (Everingham, 2001, pp. 65 - 70). 
Table 2. Distribution of Land Ownership in Nicaragua 1978-1988 (%)
Sector 1978 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Private: 100 76.6 74 64.8 63.5 61.7 60.9 60.4 60.3
Over 500 Mzn 36.2 14.8 12.5 14 12.7 10.9 9.9 9.5 9.4
200-500 Mzn 16.2 14.8 14.7 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.4 12 12
50-200 Mzn 30.1 29.6 29.5 29.6 29.6 29.6 29.9 30 30
10-50 Mzn 15.4 15.3 15.3 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.2 7.2 7.2
Less than 10 Mzn 21 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Reformed: 0 23.4 26 35.2 36.5 38.3 39.1 39.6 39.7
Cooperative 0 5.7 5.8 14.7 17.8 19.1 21.1 23.3 23.4
CCS 0 4.3 4.3 10 10 10 10 10 10
CAS 0 1.4 1.5 4.7 7.8 9.1 11.1 13.3 13.4
State farms 0 17.7 20.1 20.5 18.8 19.2 13.4 13.3 12.4
Abandoned 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.6 3 3.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Spoor (1990, p. 524)
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The Sandinistas had clearly committed to extending socialist tenurial schemes in the 
Nicaraguan rural sector. Table 2 illustrates the evolution and extent of the Sandinista land 
reform. Despite the disappointing performance of State farms, their inefficient productive 
demands were prioritized until 1986 when the Government finally turned to cooperatives in 
order to steer the development of the agricultural sector and refrain the political pressure 
from those who they promised to benefit at the beginning of the Revolution. But the formation 
of cooperatives in the second half of the decade was no socio-economic panacea.  Besides 
not granting secure property titles and sabotaging work incentives through abusive State 
control within cooperatives, the uncoordinated effects of public policies in the different 
agrarian markets contributed to a definite disarticulation of the agricultural productive 
system.
4.2. State Intervention in the Agrarian Markets 
States intervene in agrarian markets to achieve a set of economic and political objectives 
which usually include food security, income distribution, rural welfare, poverty alleviation, 
promotion of political stability and economic growth.
Before 1979 the “normal” working of the market had led to resource monopolization by 
the ruling elite. In the expanding agro-export model, latifundistas pushed basic grains 
peasants to the agricultural frontier where they found severe limitations of land (in terms of 
quality) credit, access to markets and supply of consumer goods.
Spoor (1990, p. 528) describes how the agricultural markets were dominated by a well 
articulated network of transporters, peddlers, merchants and agents of landlords, who 
came to the farm gates to buy the harvest. Many times the future harvest was sold in 
advance because of the lack of income in the non-harvest season. The situation was not 
very different from that one portrayed in Bhaduri’s (1973) agricultural backwardness under 
semi- feudalism model. 
Agricultural workers were subjected to a more direct system of exploitation. They did not 
have the possibility to buy consumer goods in the market place because landlords usually 
paid them with vouchers and certificates which only had value in the shop or commissariat 
of the patrón.  In the literature, the commissariat is described as a versatile institution. 
Commodity goods were not only sold at ridiculously high prices, but expensive credit was 
extended to small producers, setting a substantial burden on their output.
It seemed that the exploitative nature of interlinked contracts provided the agrarian 
markets with a substantial degree of coordination. The Revolution had a highly politicized 
concept of the market and particularly of the private trader. They reasoned that capitalist 
relationships like speculative marketing, land and credit practices prevented the majority of 
the rural population from benefiting in the productive process.  Therefore, the State made 
an enormous effort to create new structures that would protect urban consumers and would 
avoid squeezing rural producers.
The Sandinista government thus used instruments such as overvalued exchange rates, 
administrative prices, subsidized agricultural credit and inputs, State procurement and food 





























distribution through a network of urban and rural shops to steer agrarian markets.  However, 
policies turned terms of trade against the peasantry and the real value of agricultural wages 
dropped drastically.  The real wages of agricultural workers went down by 30-40% in the 
first years of the Revolution. The situation was so dramatic that a substantial move towards 
non-agricultural and particularly commercial activities did not increase agricultural wages 
(Spoor, 1990, p. 541).  As will be seen, the erosion of financial incentives led to complete 
agricultural stagnation by the end of the 1980’s.
In one sentence, with the Sandinista Agrarian Reform, a severe disruption of previously 
existing commercial systems occurred (FitzGeral, 1985, p. 219, cited by Jonakin, 1995, p. 
525).  In the following subsections, the contribution of fixed prices, control of marketing 
services and subsidized credit to such disruption will be analyzed.  
4.2.1. Price Controls for Agricultural and Consumption Goods 
A primary objective of the State was to protect urban consumers from price increases in 
goods of basic consumption (non-cash benefits).  Food was widely subsidized and to make 
such program viable, the government set prices that were generally not high enough to 
encourage the expansion of the marketed agricultural output.  
Prices were also biased in their calculation because data from small peasants were not 
available.  Therefore, the production costs of large and medium peasants, who employed 
different technologies from the small peasantry, were used by the government agencies to 
fix prices that could provide an expected profit margin of 5-20%. However, information on 
the generation of net revenues, supply elasticity, short term risks, relative prices, etc. was 
usually not taken into consideration (Spoor, 1993, p. 604).  In fact, official producer’s prices 
for corn and sorghum during the first four or five agricultural seasons after 1979 were so low 
that peasants using traditional technology and having low yields were not able to recover 
their production costs.  For some years, the dominant and erroneous vision in MIDINRA 
was that small peasants did not produce for the market anyway.  Such misconception 
contributed to the decline of agricultural production and the needs of the small peasantry 
were disregarded to favor the urban sector.
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Table 3. Evolution of Relative Prices in the Countryside: 1978-1984
(Current prices, Córdobas)
Producer prices:
Product Unit* 1978 1984 Growth Rate
Corn Quintal 45 325 7
Beans Quintal 110 800 7
Coffee Quintal 972 2500 3
Milk Gallon 5.8 27.5 5
Consumer prices:
Product 1978 1984 Growth Rate
Machete 22 400 18
Rubber Boots 18 500 28
Trousers 22 1800 81
Shirt 10 1400 140
  * Quintal = 45.6 kg / Gallon = 231 cubic inches
Source: Spoor (1990, p. 531) 
As a result, incentives for peasants were incorrectly calculated and by 1984 real prices had 
been allowed to fall, and consumer goods were in short supply in rural areas.  Eventually, 
this turned terms of trade against the peasantry. Table 3 roughly reflects how much their 
purchasing power was damaged.
Table 4. Macroeconomic Indexes 1980-1989
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Inflation (%) 24.3 23.2 22.2 32.9 50.2 334.3 747.4 1,347.3 3,3603.0 1,689.1
Official ER 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 28.0 70.0 70.0 920.0 38,150.0
Black Mkt ER 18.7 39.0 80.0 170.0 450.0 1,000.0 3,200.0 3,5000.0 5,500.0 50,000.0
Source: Spoor (1993, p. 638)
Prices were indexed to the official exchange rate, however, the gap between the official and 
parallel market was significant. Confronted with such new price conditions, richer peasants 
decreased their production of basic grains while medium and smaller peasants rationally 
tried to sell their products at high prices while taking advantage of the subsidies to buy 
food cheap. By the time the revolutionary government realized that its price incentives were 
insufficient to foster agricultural growth, it was unfortunately too late. Despite having all 
subsidies removed, and increasing the set output prices, by the mid 1980’s, the effect was 





























eroded by the galloping inflation due to the escalating war context.  As shown in table 4, by 
1988 inflation was above 33,000%.
4.2.2. Control of Distribution and Marketing Channels
Distribution of consumer goods and farm inputs was organized through the new State agency 
ENABAS (Empresa Nacional de Alimentos Básicos).  But, the State distribution channels in 
the countryside were not able to effectively replace the pre-revolutionary marketing systems 
that had been eliminated. The marketing system was inefficient leading to shortages and 
queues. The disappearance of old supply systems (for example, the shops or commissariats 
ran by the landlord for his workers and peasants) forced the rural population to look for 
“outside” markets (Spoor, 1990, pp. 528-532). At the same time, Zalkin (1998, pp. 56-59) 
explains how administrative limitations were a constant hamper in the commercialization 
of agricultural output. For instance, ENABAS payments by cheque to peasants were 
difficult to cash, grain storage facilities were not located in areas of greatest production 
and the insufficient State transport to collect grain made the entire process of handling the 
agricultural production troublesome and slow.  In one sentence, high transaction costs along 
with the costs imposed by war were leading to complete stagnation in the agricultural sector.
The pan-territorial pricing policy which was introduced in early 1981 and the increased 
limitations for private traders to operate legally brought about a situation in which, for some 
time, ENABAS effectively became market leader in many grain producing areas (Jonakin, 
1995, p. 522).  However, the lack of price discrimination for the quality of output and the 
simple fact that the State could not attend the marketing needs of more than 100,000 peasant 
families scattered across Nicaragua’s mountainous interior, caused the segmentation of 
markets and within a few years the appearance of parallel markets.
The urban bias of price policy together with the development of parallel markets contributed 
to a worsening of the terms of trade for the peasantry.  In fact, the peasantry became more 
and more strangled by the “market conditions” of parallel circuits, in which they were not 
officially allowed to sell their produce, but were in practice forced to buy their consumption 
necessities.  
Zalkin (1998, p. 82) argues that State marketing services and guaranteed producer grain 
prices were more of a restriction than a benefit.  Agro-export producers were also affected 
by both price and marketing controls. A characteristic case is that of coffee producers. 
Colburn (1984, p. 505) explains that under the Sandinista administration the coffee industry 
became subject to extensive State control: 65 centers were established to receive the 
harvests which the government paid for at officially imposed prices. Moreover, since the 
State controlled foreign exchange, producers were paid the international prices in córdobas 
at the overvalued official exchange rate.  Output and quality levels started to decline in the 
absence of financial incentives and this increased uncertainty. However, Colburn (1984, p. 
510) also describes that the fixed-investment nature of coffee production and the threat of 
confiscation ensured that producers did not abandon the activity completely, since un-used 
land was subject to confiscation without any State compensation.
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4.2.3. Subsidized Credit and Inputs
An economic goal of the Sandinista credit policy was to alter the distorted pattern of 
agricultural growth and income distribution promoted under the agro-export model.  For 
example, in 1978 only 20,000 peasant families covering 88,000 manzanas received credit, 
whereas during the period 1981 -1984 the average number of peasant families receiving 
rural credit rose dramatically to 81,600 on 282,000 manzanas (Enríquez & Spalding, 1987, 
p. 113).
Receipt of credit was expected to enhance the net revenues and so, massive access to 
credit was granted. In fact, it has been argued that the Sandinista credit program virtually 
eliminated all forms of credit rationing except borrower self-selection (Carter, 1989, p. 15). 
The data set used by Carter (1989) reported only 71 cases of credit denial by the bank out of 
some 2,100 loan applications. Moreover, in response to natural disasters, such as hurricanes 
and droughts in 1982, 1983 and 1988, peasant credit obligations were forgiven.  Because 
of high rate of default and the implicit subsidy through fixed (non-indexed) interest rates 
during times of inflation, credit effectively became an important source of income during the 
non-harvest season.  Eventually, these State credit procedures along with the social and war 
expenditure led to unsustainable external debt.6
In the case of agro-export producers, despite the generous access to credit, there were no 
incentives to invest because of the uncertainty generated by the war, the threat of squatters 
and the generalized perception of arbitrary land confiscations. Colburn (1984, p. 513) claims 
that even a government report acknowledged that coffee growers were unwilling to commit 
their own capital to investment in coffee production.
The effect of factor subsidies was to introduce profound distortions in relative factor prices, 
resulting in factor misallocation and social inefficiencies, as well as growing trade deficits 
(Jonakin, 1996, p. 68).  For example, by 1987 Spoor (1993, p. 630) reported that tractors 
were cheaper than a pair of oxen. Eventually the capital intensive technology worsened 
agricultural unemployment.
The Nicaraguan case proves that abundant access to credit and other subsidized inputs 
(fertilizers, machinery, etc.) does not necessarily lead to growth.  More importantly, it 
reconfirms the major impact that financial incentives, marketing institutions and economic 
and political stability have on development.  
5. Conclusions
The Sandinista Agrarian Reform altered profoundly the Nicaraguan institutional framework. 
By the 1990’s property rights to over 40% of the country’s land had been altered and not 
clearly redefined.  Moreover, the sudden formulation of the Law of Protection of Agricultural 
Property (March 1990) created further tensions because the law exposed serious flaws in 
the titling method. The Inter-American Development Bank has estimated that around US$2 
billion would be necessary to compensate 75% of the original owners. Everingham (2001, pp. 
65-78) argues that such amount would jeopardize the national economic health by placing 
an unsustainable fiscal burden.   





























Ultimately, the Sandinista Revolution did not achieve any of the two principal economic 
goals stated by Close (1988).  Firstly, instead of restructuring the economy to make it less 
dependent on the export of raw materials, Nicaragua’s GDP and volume of exports declined 
precipitously under the combined conditions of internal war and poor State performance 
(see table 5). Secondly, the Agrarian Reform did not achieve its objective of providing long-
term benefits to the “popular” classes. The Gini coefficient, reflecting the degree of land 
ownership inequality, in a study by Deininger and Zegarra (2003, p. 1390), was estimated 
to be 0.86 by the late 1990’s, although this reversal in ownership distribution has not been 
studied in depth.  
Table 5. GDP and Exports Evolution
1979 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1989 1990
GDP* 1,612.70 2,079.90 2,725.90 2,777.90 2,204.20 1,449.30 1,020.60 1,516.70
Exports 
FOB* 566.5 445.1 408.2 413 247.8 232.6 310.8 330.5
Export / 
GDP 35.1% 21.4% 15.0% 14.9% 11.2% 16.0% 30.5% 21.8%
* Millions US$
Source:  Banco Central de Nicaragua
The above-mentioned suggests that the land reform, which affected a substantial fraction of 
the cultivable territory, along with its interventionist agrarian policies, not only failed to alter 
the pre-1979 exploitative market structures but it incited institutional friction, increased 
public indebtedness, damaged work incentives and disarticulated the agrarian production 
system.  Key determinants to this outcome were: the lack of organizational capacity, the 
loss of financial incentives, the urban bias of the agrarian policies, the failure to allocate 
clear property rights, the increased level of business uncertainty and the perceived level of 
arbitrariness in the land reform process.  
Naturally, the war also contributes to explaining the poor performance of the Sandinista 
administration.  Even though the conflict was geographically confined and it never reached 
the fertile lands of Nicaragua’s pacific coast, it destabilized the Revolution’s economic 
program in several ways. The Counterrevolutionary attacks served to perpetuate business 
uncertainty; to undermine political support and to create a shortage of rural labor supply 
because of the government’s need to expand the national army.
Nevertheless, Zalkin (1990, p. 64) summarizes the problem of the Sandinista Revolution as 
not being able to promote the right incentives in the economy.  He argues that even without 
the effects of the war, the excessive bureaucratic control would have still substantially 
contributed to the decline of agricultural production. 
Still, as land restitution claims are slowly resolved and legitimate property titles are issued, 
it becomes clearer that without a coordinated functioning of relevant factor markets, 
opportunities for rural development are minimal. It is important to recognize that in 
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developing economies, markets are usually incomplete and imperfect, perpetuating unequal 
access to resources that increase poverty levels.  For such reason, defining an accurate 
degree of State intervention in the relevant agrarian markets is crucial and finding the 
balance between market and policy incentives in fragmented economies is a real challenge.
Notes
1 Nicaragua’s total land area is 8,073,000 manzanas.  (1 manzana = 0.7 hectares = 1.75 acres) (Zalkin, 1990, p. 48).
2 20% of the country’s arable lands belonged to the Somoza family (1936-1979) and their associates (Close, 1988, p. 83).  
3 It has been estimated that of all tenanted land, some 84.5% is sharecropped in Asia while only 16.1% is sharecropped in 
Latin America (Todaro & Smith, 2003, p. 433)
4 Equivalent  to approximately 1.6 million manzanas.
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